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EDUCATION

- University of Pittsburgh.* Ph.D. Candidate, Economics. May 2008. (Expected)
University of Barcelona. M.Sc. in Economics (DEA). Spain, June 2002.
University of Valparaiso. B.S. Industrial Engineering, with Honors. Chile, 1998.
B.A. Business Administration, with Honors. 1996

RESEARCH INTERESTS

PRIMARY: Environmental Economics and Game Theory

SECONDARY: Industrial Organization, Public Economics and Applied Microeconomics.

RESEARCH PAPERS

- **Free-riding and cooperation in environmental games. (Job Market Paper)**

This paper examines the negotiation of an international environmental agreement in which different countries determine the (non-enforceable) promises of investment in clean technologies to be included in the agreement. Furthermore, it analyzes countries' optimal investment in emission-reducing technologies, considering that, in addition to the utility that a country perceives from an improved environmental quality, it is also concerned about the relative fulfillment of the terms specified in the international agreement either by itself or by others. I show, first, why countries may prefer to shift most promises of investment in clean technologies to other countries, despite the fact that these promises are usually non-enforceable by any international organization. Second, I determine countries' optimal investments in these technologies, and analyze how their particular investments depend on how demanding the international agreement is, and on the importance that countries assign to each others' relative fulfillment of their part of the treaty.

- **Green Auctions: a biodiversity study of mechanism design with externalities. (Forthcoming in *Journal of Ecological Economics*).**

This paper uses a mechanism design approach to study the biodiversity improvement in a territory, where the government is the principal and the landholders are the agents. In particular, I analyze an optimal mechanism that considers a multidimensional bid which includes both the biodiversity improvement of the project and its cost. Additionally, this mechanism incorporates the externality (either positive or negative) that a biodiversity project causes in the surrounding agents who decided not to participate. Specifically, I assume that externalities enter in the cost function of the nonparticipating landholders. I show that, in the case of negative externalities, the government will implement a transfer function which is decreasing in the landholder's efficiency level. On the other hand, in the case of a positive externality, paradoxically the government may be interested in the nonparticipation of the most efficient landholders.

- **The importance of foregone options: generalizing social comparisons in sequential-move games. (with Felix Munoz-Garcia)**

Extensive experimental evidence supports the importance of a player's unchosen alternatives on other agent's actions. This paper examines a tractable theoretical model that introduces these unchosen alternatives into individuals' preferences via a reference point. We first analyze the equilibrium prediction in complete information sequential-move games, and then compare it with that of standard games where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payoff comparisons (i.e., with strictly individualistic preferences), our model predicts higher levels of fairness in the resulting allocation, as well as higher cooperation among the players, than standard game-theoretic models. In addition, our framework embodies different behavioral models, such as those on inequity aversion and intentions-based reciprocity, as special cases. Finally, we confirm our results in three economic applications: the ultimatum bargaining game, the labor market gift exchange game, and the sequential public good game.

- **The effect of Parental Leave on female employment: evidence from state policies. (with Sunita Mondal)**

This paper analyzes the effect of federal and state maternity leave policies on female employment. In particular, we analyze if the enactment of the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993 differently affected those states which previously implemented maternity leave policies at the state level than those states which did not. Additionally, we examine if this federal law has provoked a higher increase in the female employment in those states which expanded its benefits and eligibility criteria than in those states which did not expand them. Finally, we analyze the Paid Family Leave program implemented by California in 2004, and compare how the change in female employment in this state differs from those states applying federal or state maternity leave policies. Our results confirm the positive effect of FMLA on female employment for high school drop out women and suggest that in general the change in female employment is positive and significant when states make FMLA more generous.

WORK IN PROGRESS

- **When should a firm expand its business? An analysis of business expansions when they signal market conditions. (with Esther Gal-Or and Felix Munoz-Garcia)**

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- *University of Pittsburgh.*
 - Instructor of Introduction to Environmental Economics, Summer 2006, [latest evaluations: 4.13/5].
 - TA of Game Theory, Summer 2007. TA of Introduction to Microeconomics, 2004-07.
- *ESADE-University Studies Center.*
 - Instructor of Intermediate Microeconomics. Barcelona, Spain. Summer 2001.
- *University of Valparaiso.*
 - TA of Introduction to Economics, Introduction to Microeconomics, Intermediate Microeconomics and Introduction to Macroeconomics. Chile, 1996-98.
- *University Federico Santa Maria.*
 - TA of Intermediate Microeconomics and Marketing. Chile, 1997-98.
- *University of Viña del Mar.*
 - Instructor for Governmental Programs. Chile, 1997-98.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant

- Center for Information Technologies. University of Barcelona, Spain 2002.
- Barcelona Institute of Economics. Spain, 2001- 02.
- Chilean Oil Company COPEC. Chile, 1995.

Advisor

- Customs National Service. Chile, 1998 – 2000.
- Innovation and development of nonpolluting technologies. FinanProyect Consulting. Chile, 1996–98.

ACADEMIC AWARDS

- Full tuition scholarship and stipend from University of Pittsburgh, 2003-present.
- Arts & Sciences Research Fellowship, Summer and Fall 2007.
- GSO and GPSA Travel Grants, University of Pittsburgh, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 2006.
- Full tuition. University of Barcelona, 2001-02.

SELECTED PRESENTATIONS

- XXXII Simposio de Análisis Económico in Granada, Spain. December 13-15, 2007.
- CU Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop. Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder. September 21-22, 2007.
- Public Economic Theory Conference (PET07). Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. July 06-08, 2007.
- 7th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice Dedicated to Energy, Environment and Natural Resources. HEC Montréal, Canada. May 28 - 30, 2007.
- Midwest Economics Association, 71st Annual Meeting. Minnesota. March 23-25, 2007.
- Seminar in Microeconomic Theory. Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh. November 2006.
- 8th Annual BIOECON Conference on the Economic Analysis of Ecology and Biodiversity. Kings College Cambridge, University of Cambridge, UK. August 29-30, 2006.
- Climate change in the Mediterranean region - part II: socio-economic aspects and impacts. The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy. November 12-16, 2001.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Citizenship: Chilean.

Visa type: F1

Date of birth: October 08, 1974

Languages: Spanish (native), English (fluent), Catalan (advanced) and Italian (beginner).

References

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