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Personal Information

I was born the 18 of March, 1977. I am married without children.

Nationality : Portuguese and Venezuelan.

Languages: Spanish (native), English (fluent), French (fluent), Portuguese (understanding text, speech), Catalan (understanding text, speech).

Research and Teaching Fields

Public Economics, Political Economy, Environmental Economics, Microeconomics.

Education

Ph.D. in Economics. Université de Toulouse I, France. (March 30, 2007)

Master of Arts in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Université de Toulouse I. 2002

Bachelor of Science in Economics. Universidad Central de Venezuela, Venezuela. 1999.

Working Papers

"Political support for the private system to finance political parties" (Job Market Paper)

In a Downsian model of political competition we compare the equilibrium income tax and redistribution level obtained from two systems to finance parties' political campaigns: The public and the private system. In the private system ideological voters make campaign contributions to increase the chances of winning of their preferred party among uninformed voters. In the public system parties receive funds from the government in proportion to their voting share. If voters are sufficiently ideological the private system may induce high aggregate spending and extreme policies. Nevertheless, it may be supported by a majority

of voters because of the indirect effect of contributions in the equilibrium redistribution level and probability of winning of each party.

"Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax-mix" (*submitted*)

The traditional Downsian model of political competition predicts redistribution levels increasing with inequality. However there is not clear evidence that unequal societies redistribute more. When redistribution is financed through income taxes the existence of an informal sector that evades income taxes reduces the tax-base more the more unequal the society is. We find a more complex relationship between inequality and redistribution: Redistribution is an inverted U-shaped function of the equality index. We show that the tax-base effect along with the political channel determines the structure of the tax-mix, composed by income and consumption taxes. Moreover we give a rationale for the fact that more unequal societies may rely more heavily on indirect taxes, although average regressive.

"A probabilistic voting model of progressive taxation with incentive effects"

We study what are the conditions for a marginal progressive tax to emerge in equilibrium in the probabilistic voting model. If the elasticity of labor supply decreases with earnings ability and the size of the poor and rich group coincide, when following Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) only marginal progressive taxes are played by both candidates in equilibrium. Following instead the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) model marginal progressive taxes emerges as long as the political power of the rich is sufficiently small. The degree of progressivity is increasing with the size of the middle class.

"Public, private and nonprofit regulation for environmental quality," (with Lucie Bottega) (*invited resubmission*)

This paper studies the welfare implications of different institutions certifying environmental quality supplied by a monopoly. The monopolist can voluntarily certify the quality of the product through an eco-label provided either by an NGO or a for-profit private certifier (PC). The NGO and the PC may use advertisement to promote the label. We compare the NGO and PC regimes with the regime where the regulator imposes a minimum quality standard. The presence of a private certifier in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green advertisement reinforces the above result.

Work Experience

- Lecturer at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2007-2008.
Statistics I (2nd year, undergraduate).
- Lecturer at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2006-2007.
Mathematics for Economists II (1st year, undergraduate).
- Lecturer at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2006-2007.
Game theory (3th year, undergraduate).
- Lecturer and teacher assistance at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2004-2006.
Microeconomics II (2nd year, undergraduate).

- Lecturer at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2003-2004.
Macroeconomics I (2nd year, undergraduate).
- Teacher assistance at Université de Toulouse I, 2002-2003.
Introductory Microeconomics (AES: Administration, Economics and Sociology, undergraduate).

Fellowship

Pre-doctoral exchange program Marie Curie fellowships. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain, 2003.

Congresses and workshops

- Winter School on "Polarization and Conflict". Córdoba, 2006. Presenting: "Political support for the private system to finance political parties".
- EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics). Amsterdam, 2006. Presenting "Public, private and nonprofit regulation for environmental quality".
- Summer school on "Economic Analysis of Heterogeneity in Social Organizations". Louvain-la-Neuve, 2006. Presenting "Political support for the private system to finance political parties".
- PET Meeting (Public Economic Theory). Marseille, 2005. Presenting "Public, private and nonprofit regulation for environmental quality" and "Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax-mix".
- EALE/SOLE Second world labor economics conference. San Francisco, 2005. Presenting "Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax-mix".
- Summer school on "Economic Analysis of Heterogeneity in Social Organizations". Louvain-la-Neuve, 2005. Presenting "Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax-mix".
- ASSET Meeting (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists). Barcelona, 2004. Presenting "Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax-mix".
- Microeconomics Workshop at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2004. Presenting "Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax-mix".

References

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